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ABSTRACT 
Every secure system has the possibility to fail. Therefore, extra effort should be taken to protect these systems. Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDSs) had been proposed with the aim of providing extra protection to security systems. These 
systems trigger thousands of alerts per day, which prompt security analysts to verify each alert for relevance and severity 
based on an aggregation criterion. Several aggregation methods have been proposed to collect these alerts. This paper 
presents our threshold aggregation system (TAS). Results shows that TAS aggregates IDS alerts accurately based on 
user demands and threshold value. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The use of the Internet and other networks has become essential and extensive. Correspondingly, the threats and intruder 
activities have become wider and smarter. IDS triggers huge amounts of alerts by detecting these intrusions. Analysts try 
to analyze these alerts to determine the cause, relations between alerts, severity, and other features of the intrusions. The 
huge amount of alert data triggered by IDS causes problems during analysis. Several studies have been conducted to 
help analysts study these alert files with ease. 
RELATED WORK 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS). 
The use of the Internet and other networks has become essential and extensive. Correspondingly, the threats and intruder 
activities have become wider and smarter. IDS triggers huge amounts of alerts by detecting these intrusions. Analysts try 
to analyze these alerts to determine the cause, relations between alerts, severity, and other features of the intrusions. The 
huge amount of alert data triggered by IDS causes problems during analysis. Several studies have been conducted to 
help analysts study these alert files. 
Aggregation technique is a major part of correlation techniques. Aggregation has the ability to reduce the complexity 
involved in alert analysis [1] because the correlation will reduce the amount of alerts after redundancies have been 
removed through aggregation removal process [2]. The correlation techniques classify the alerts based on features such 
as IP addresses and port numbers. The higher degree of overall similarity of the alerts in the same class will be correlated 
[3]. 
Correlation Techniques 
Ning et al. [1] proposed hyper-alert correlation graphs to discover the attack scenarios based on the specification of 
individual attacks. Valdes [4] depended on probability approach to correlate the alerts. Debar and Wespi [2] created their 
correlation method based on duplicates and consequences mechanism. Consequence mechanism deals with a set of 
alerts linked in a given order within a given time interval. Duplicate mechanism deals with duplicate alerts from different 
IDS sensors that have the same identical quadruple (source address, source port, target address, and target port). 
Aggregation Techniques 
Cuppens [5, 6] developed an aggregation and correlation module (MIRADOR) based on a similarity formulation used to 
determine the correlation. Yu et al. [7, 8] relied on three functions to aggregate the alerts (alert preprocessing, alert 
clustering, and collaborative alert merging). The core of this aggregation method is the alert clustering which groups the 
alerts into different clusters according to the source, target, time, and classification. Zhihong et al. [9] present their 
aggregation method using the similarity degree function. This function uses probability evaluation before clustering alerts 
into groups. Liu et al. [10] created an alert aggregation and used it as a sub-model in the NSSA model by adopting an alert 
aggregation arithmetic. The aggregation model summarizes the alerts base on source IP and attack type after setting a 
time window. Fan et al. [11] proposed aggregation algorithm based on category and similarity. Fan’s algorithm starts with 
an analysis of attack intentions, followed by aggregation of alerts based on two types of feature sub-groups. Feature sub-
groups are divided into categorical such as IPs and ports, and numerical such as packet length. Hofmann and Sick [12] 
proposed an online alert aggregation based on a probability model. Their work is made up of two phases - online and 
offline alert aggregations. Offline approach is extended to an on-line approach used for dynamic attack situations.  
Valdes proposed a general aggregation algorithm framework by including the five parameters: (Source IP addresses, 
Source Ports, Destination IP Addresses, Destination Ports, and Alert Generation Time). The compression result of each 
feature is a value between 0 or 1 result [4]. An enhancement of the Valdes proposal study was conducted by Mu et al, 
they provided better experiment results because of the use of the source IP addresses and alert generation time only [18].  
Aggregation Based on Time 
A new proposal was made by [13] to reduce the false positive in the anomaly detectors by depending on time as one 
feature to compare with. Their method was based on time intervals. The method suggests that any IDS may recognize an 
anomaly at time tn = t0 + tn and another anomaly at time th = t0 + th. Generally, the difference between tn and th will be 
insignificant. They proposed using the threshold value of Tnear. where if |tn - th| ≤ Tnear then, both attacks belong to each 
other in terms of SIP, DIP, and IDS. This work was only applied to the anomaly attacks with time intervals; signature-
based IDS were not considered. 
THRESHOLD AGGREGATION SYSTEM (TAS) 
TAS was built over the threshold aggregation framework TAF [14]. 
Alert Standardization  
The aggregation methods deal with a heterogeneous alert log file, which receives multiple alert format types from IDSs. 
The aggregation method must standardize these alerts. Based on TAF, the aggregation will affect only the alerts with 
minimum quadruple features (SIP, S Port, DIP, and D Port). In the case of UDP, no ports are present. Instead, another set 
of two features should be present, namely, protocol and the alert type. The best aggregation will work on the eight 
requirements including the quadruple features shown in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1 Definition of Alert Requirement Features 
TAS Method 
Alerts got several features. Aggregation will be conducted based on these features, regardless of time difference between 
the alerts. In TAS, to aggregate two or more alerts, a threshold value should be applied for more accurate combination 
results, as shown in the next section. Time feature was used so that alerts will not be rejected even with the slightest 
difference on threshold value. The correlation method built over this aggregation method will have more accurate result 
alerts without redundant alerts.  
Figure 3.2 shows the TAS flowchart. TAS has two types of inputs - the IDS alerts and the user aggregation options. 
Aggregation will be conducted based on these two inputs. The user will choose the type of aggregation method to be used 
in IDS alerts. TAS will start processing the IDS alerts by analyzing, manipulating, and then parsing the alerts. A two-phase 
checking process will be conducted subsequently before deciding whether to drop or save the alert in the database. 
Finally, the result will be presented or saved in the database depending on user request. TAS got three main components: 
the data controller, framework core, and aggregation controller. Figure 3.3 shows the architecture of TAS. 
Data Controller 
This is the first component in the system responsible for extracting the features from the IDS alerts after receiving them 
from heterogeneous log file. This data controller has three subcomponents: data analyzer, data manipulator, and data 
parser. 
Framework Core TASCore 
This is the main component in the framework that handles the request from the user and controls the whole framework. 
After parsing the IDS alerts, the TASCore will start checking the alerts to see whether the features are extracted or not. 
The alerts are then saved in the database and finally retrieved to the display or the aggregation component (AgC). The 
TASCore has four subcomponents: alert checker, query generator, database storage controller, and database retrieval. 
Aggregation Controller (AgC) 
This component handles the aggregation method that consolidates the alerts into groups based on the chosen 
subcomponents. These subcomponents will be chosen by the user to control the number of groups that the aggregation 
method will create. The subcomponents are: severity, protocol, time, alert classification, and alert specification (source 
and destination IPs and ports). Threshold value is the core of this component. The whole aggregation alert amount will be 
based on this threshold value. 
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Figure 3.2 TAS flowchart  
 
Table 1. Examples of Alerts 
A
le
rt
1
 Before 
12/27-15:31:30.255452  [**] [1:1394:7] SHELLCODE x86 NOOP 
[**] [Classification: Executable code was detected] [Priority: 1] 
{UDP} 192.168.1.4:137 -> 192.168.1.1:137 
After 
12/27-15:31:30.255452, Executable code was detected, 1, UDP, 
192.168.1.4, 137, 192.168.1.1, 137 
A
le
rt
2
 Before 
12/27-15:30:44.858790  [**] [1:402:8] ICMP Destination 
Unreachable Port Unreachable [**] [Classification: Misc activity] 
[Priority: 3] {ICMP} 192.168.1.2 -> 192.168.1.4 
After 
12/27-15:30:44.858790, Misc activity, 3  ICMP, 192.168.1.2, 
0000   192.168.1.4,  0000 
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Figure 3.3 Threshold Aggregation Framework (TAF) [14] 
IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS 
We used Snort in our evaluation [15], which is an open source intrusion detection system that triggers alerts after 
detecting attacks. The rules of Snort, as well as the process on how Snort works to detect the intrusions, were not given 
focus because there is no intention to evaluate the performance of Snorts.  
The alerts triggered from a multiple IDSs are saved into one heterogeneous file. Each alert in the saved file is represented 
by several features depending on the version of Snort and how the Snort was configured, the type of IDS sensor, and the 
alert type (full mode or fast mode) [16]. 
Focus is given on full mode alerts made up of eight features: date with timestamp, source IP, source port, destination IP, 
destination port, alert type, severity, and protocol. Table 1 shows two examples of the alerts before and after the 8 
features were extracted.  
TAS was built using Java programming language and MYSQL database technology. TAS can be used as standalone 
system to read any IDS alert type if it is contains the minimum requirements. Therefore, TAS can read and analyze 
heterogeneous log alert files, making the analyst’s job easier. TAS has three main parts: the user which chooses 
aggregation options and the value of threshold, the IDS alerts to be used in the framework, and the database which holds 
the processed alerts and the aggregated alerts. 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
In order to evaluate the performance of the alert aggregation, we conducted two types of tests over five different files 
containing different amounts of alerts (100, 500, 1000, 5000, and 10000). Each file was aggregated four times: with 
threshold value; without threshold value, with four features, and with eight features. The TAS evaluation is based on the 
following: 
The result of aggregating alerts without threshold.  
Aggregation without threshold can be conducted in two ways - by selecting all eight features or by selecting some of the 
features [2, 4, 17]. The quadruple features were chosen, which are the minimum requirements mentioned in Section two. 
The eight features were then chosen to aggregate the alerts. The study relied on exact matching of the alert features. 
Table 2 shows the number of alerts in the log file and the number of aggregated alerts in the two processes which are 
illustrated in Figure 5.1. 
The result of aggregating alerts with threshold. 
Aggregation using threshold can also be achieved in two ways, either by selecting the eight features or by selecting the 
quadruple features plus the time. Depending on exact matching of the alert features and an experimental threshold value, 
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we performed our testing. Table 3 shows the number of alerts in the log file and the number of aggregated alerts in the two 
ways which are illustrated in Figure 5.2. 
Tables (2 and 3) show that the amounts of incomplete alerts (Inc) are the same since the same data were used for testing. 
The redundant alerts (Red) which had been deleted by the aggregation is different. Obviously, the amounts of redundant 
alerts in both cases of 8 features and 4 features are higher than what are presented in Table 3. Depending on how many 
times the alert is repeated, regardless of the time in Table 2, and by taking the time in Table 3, the aggregation will delete 
the alert. The amount of aggregated alerts (Agg) in Table 2 for the two cases of 8 features and 4 features are less than 
what we have presented in Table 3. We depend on the time to aggregate the alert, and thus we should have more 
accurate alerts to use in the correlation process later. 
Difference between TAS aggregation and other approaches:  
In TAS, we filtered the alerts and chose the correct one that should be used in the second phase of aggregation based on 
the user demands. The process will decrease the aggregation process time. TAS aggregates the IDS alerts based on user 
demands and shows full details results based on aggregation alerts, redundant alerts, and incomplete alerts. 
Table 2. The Aggregated Alerts Samples without Threshold 
Amount of Alerts 
Selection Method 
8 Features 4 Features 
Agg Inc Red Agg Inc Red 
100 67 7 26 32 7 61 
500 274 30 196 123 30 347 
1000 679 83 238 289 83 628 
5000 3048 214 1738 1947 214 2839 
10000 6147 647 3206 3417 647 5936 
Table 3. The Aggregated Alerts Samples with Threshold 
Amount of Alerts 
Selection Method 
8 Features 4 Features 
Agg Inc Red Agg Inc Red 
100 81 7 12 73 7 20 
500 423 30 47 362 30 108 
1000 818 83 99 697 83 220 
5000 4310 214 476 3647 214 1139 
10000 8324 647 1029 7314 647 2039 
 
 
Figure 5.1 The result of aggregating alerts of 8 and 4 features without threshold (Refer to the Appendix for more Details)  
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Figure 5.2 The result of aggregating alerts of 8 and 4 features with threshold value (Refer to the Appendix for more Details) 
CONCLOSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Reducing the amount of alerts triggered by IDSs is a challenging area of network security and involves several 
methods and technologies. In this paper, we focused on aggregating IDS alerts by using the difference in the time stamp 
between the similar alerts as threshold value. Table 4 and Figure 6.1 show that better results are achieved when IDS 
alerts are aggregated based on threshold. By using threshold value, the results had been enhanced by 41% with 4 
features and 21% with 8 features.  
Further research should be conducted to parallelize the TAS to obtain faster results since the heterogeneous alert file 
sizes are large and take a long time to read. On the other hand, correlation methods can be studied and applied over 
aggregation method (TAS) to obtain more accurate alerts. 
Table 4. Total amount of aggregated alerts with total reduced alerts average 
Amount of Alerts 
Selection Method 
Without Th With Th 
Avg 8 Avg 4 Avg 8 Avg 4 
100 67% 32% 81% 73% 
500 55% 25% 85% 72% 
1000 68% 29% 82% 70% 
5000 61% 39% 86% 73% 
10000 61% 34% 83% 73% 
Total Avg 62% 32% 83% 72% 
 
 
Figure 6.1 The Final result for comparing aggregating with threshold and without threshold 
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APPENDIX  
 
 
Figure 1 The result of aggregating alerts of 8 features without threshold 
 
Figure 2 The result of aggregating alerts of 4 features without threshold 
 
 
Figure 3 The result of aggregating alerts of 8 features with threshold 
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Figure 4 The result of aggregating alerts of 4 features with threshold 
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